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THE DANGERS OF LIBERAL 
NEO-COLONIALISM: ELEPHANTS, 
IVORY AND THE CITES TREATY 
THADDEUS McBRIDE* 
THE DILEMMAS OF AFRICANIZATION: CHOICES AND DAN-
GERS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. By L. DALTON CASTO. Califor-
nia: Mrican Ways Publishing. 1998. Pp. 280. 
Every man has the right to decide his own destiny.) 
-Bob Marley 
The mascot of Kenya's tasty national beer, Tusker, is an elephant. 
Trumpeting mightily into the air, the large elephant dominates the 
label of Tusker bottles. Tusker's motto, "My country, my beer," further 
serves notice that this is a product about which Kenyans feel strongly. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Kenya Breweries, the maker of 
Tusker, chose the elephant to represent the beer. It may not be king 
of the jungle, but as a symbol of national pride, the elephant rules 
supreme.2 
Mrican elephants have no natural enemies other than man.s It is 
humans alone, therefore, who will decide the fate of these remarkable 
creatures.4 Unfortunately, in recent years though, we have not done an 
effective job of protecting elephants from ourselves.5 As a result, ele-
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. The author would like to thank 
Professor David Wirth for his insights. This Note is dedicated to Christian Wright. 
1 Bob Marley, Zimbabwe, on SONGS OF FREEDOM (Island Records 1992). 
2 See james Macharia, Castle's Ranger Brew on Hold After Patent Challenge, BUSINESS NEWS 
Oohannesburg), Dec. 24, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Most Recent 90 Days File 
(discussing distinctiveness of Tusker's elephant logo). 
3 See Michael]. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM.]. INT'L L. 1, 2 
(1990). Glennon notes that on occasion, lions will prey upon newborn elephant calves. See id. 
His article extensively details the lives and characteristics of Mrican elephants. See id. at 2-5. 
Around the world, people of all ages are fascinated by elephants. See Laurie Willis, Tracking 
Elephants on the Web, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, jan. 18, 1999, at A3. 
4 See generally Glennon, supra note 3. 
5 See Importation, Exportation, and Transportation of Wildlife; Special Rules for Import and 
Export of Mrican Elephant Ivory, 54 Fed. Reg. 19417, available in 1989 WL 304395 [hereinafter 
Importation]. As this report explains, elephant populations in parts of Mrica have diminished by 
up to 90% in recent decades. See id. 
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phant populations have declined, a drop mainly attributable to poach-
ing.6 
The international community has taken some steps to reverse this 
trend.7 In particular, the United Nations adopted the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
("CITES" or "the Convention"), which entered into force inJuly, 1975.8 
In addition to trying to protect elephants, CITES generally acknow-
ledges the importance of protecting all fragile wildlife, and creates 
guidelines by which to do SO.9 This pursuit is admirable, yet it presents 
problems to the international legal order in the way it impinges on 
individual state sovereignty.lO Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
controversial ivory ban, enacted in 1989 following the seventh CITES 
Conference of Parties (COP7).11 
The debate about CITES serves as a strong reminder that Africa 
is not far removed from the imperial era.12 L. Dalton Casto explores 
the history of post-colonial Africa in his recent book, The Dilemmas of 
Africanization: Choices and Dangers for Sub-Saharan Africa.13 His work 
specifically focuses on the four countries, Botswana,14 Namibia,I5 Zim-
6 See id. at 19417. 
7 See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 
1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, 1087 [hereinafter CITES]. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 1090. 
10 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Com-
mons: Can We Prosper and Protect7, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1407, 1424 (1992). 
II See Christopher Munnion, Poachers Profit from Easing of Trade Ban, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Oct. 31, 1997, at 18. In fact, the ivory ban has provided fodder for pundits who 
question the merits of CITES on the whole. See id. Under the terms of the Convention, the 
Secretariat is to call meetings of all the parties no more than two years apart. See CITES, supra 
note 7, art. XI, 27 U.S.T. at 1104. 
12 See Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U.]. INT'L 
L. & POL'y 903, 909 (1997) (discussing the fact that when institutions were created in colonial 
Africa, little account was taken either of an action's effect on the people of the country, or of the 
appropriateness of Western-style policies in the respective country). For the purposes of this book 
review, any reference to Africa means su~aran Africa. 
13 See generally L. DALTON CASTO, THE DILEMMAS OF AFRICANIZATION: CHOICES AND DANGERS 
FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1998). Casto, an American business and economic consultant, has 
spent considerable time in Africa working with native governments and groups. See id. 
14 See id. at 63-71. Casto describes Botswana's remarkable and long-running democracy. See 
id. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the country is totally land-locked and largely desert. 
See id. at 63. 
15 See id. at 135-44, 153-90. Namibia, until recently a South African colony, gained its 
independence in 1990. See id. at 1SO-81. Casto traces the course of Namibia's history until 
independence, emphasizing how the country factored into the battle against South African 
apartheid. See id. at 135-44, 153-90. 
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babwe,16 and South Africa (RSA),17 that comprise most of Southern 
Africa. Casto particularly discusses RSA's apartheid state, and describes 
its transformation into a democracy. IS Though uncertain about RSA's 
future, Casto compares the country favorably with the other African 
nations he has visited and studied.19 In general, Casto is not confident 
that the democratic pursuit will be easy for any African nation, con-
cluding that state mismanagement and Western apathy most likely will 
doom the region.20 
Perversely, the tension created by CITES is a product of effective 
African management, and an overabundance of Western interven-
tion.21 In short, CITES sets limits on the trade in elephant ivory, a 
diminution southern African states believe is unwarranted.22 The de-
bate about CITES also implicates different opinions about the extent 
to which local communities should be involved in elephant manage-
ment.23 No one contests the need to develop programs that ensure 
sustainable development. 24 The dispute centers on how best to achieve 
this objective; that is, how to establish an environment in which ele-
phants, agriculture and human beings can co-exist peacefully.25 
Using Casto's narrative as a springboard, this book review seeks to 
provide some answers. Section I briefly evaluates CITES, and the pro-
visions of it that most affect the trade in ivory. Section II describes the 
ivory ban enacted in 1989, and its effect until it was rescinded in 1997. 
Section III explores ways different countries have tried to manage their 
elephant populations. This book review concludes that the ivory trade 
should be continued, and that the best way to sustain both the trade 
and elephant populations, is through culling.26 Contrary to Casto's 
16See ill. at 17-44. Zimbabwe, which gained independence in 1980, has labored under 
mismanagement, economic problems and property inequalities. See ill. 
17 See ill. at 73-134, 191-264. Casto's discussion of South Africa covers the bulk of the book. 
See id. This book review does make references to South Africa and to its attitude towards CITES, 
but it primarily focuses on Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. See infra Parts I-III. 
18 See CASTO, supra note 13, at 206--63. 
19 See id. at 243-44. 
20 See id. at 265-73. 
21 See generally Patty F. Storey, Student Article, Df:Uelopment vs. Conservatitm: The Future of the 
African Elephant, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 375 (1994) (tracing the history of measures 
designed to protect elephants and comparing CITES disfavorably with the United Nations Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, which was convened in 1992). 
22 See id. at 392. 
25 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 See generally id. at 392-95. 
26 See infra notes 186--211 and accompanying text. 
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pessimistic predictions, Mricans can prosper given the opportunity and 
independence to address this type of difficult international issue.27 
Along these lines, the conclusion implicitly supports Mrican self-deter-
mination, while warning against the proliferation of neo-colonial in-
ternational agreements such as CITES.28 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONVENTION 
When CITES first was adopted, there was little world concern 
about regulating the ivory trade. 29 In fact, the UN initiated the nego-
tiations that led to CITES primarily because of the fervent efforts of a 
few public interest non-governmental organizations (NGOS).30 These 
NGOs believed customary international law, which arguably dictates 
that countries must protect endangered species,3l was not sufficient to 
ensure the animals' survival.32 Mter all, while customary international 
law is binding on all states, it is only effective to the extent it can be 
enforced.!!!! Formal agreements tend to levy greater responsibility on 
27 See infra notes 21S-28 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 229-44 and accompanying text. 
29 See David S. Favre, The Risk of Extinction: A Risk Analysis of the Endangered Species Act as 
Compared to CITES, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 341, 348 (1998) [hereinafter Favre, Risk of Extinction]. 
50 See Phillippe J. Sands & Albert P. Bedecarre, Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered species: The Role of Public Interest Non-Governmental Organiz.ations in Ensuring the Effective 
Enfurcementofthe Ivory Trade Ban, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 799, SOO (1990). The authors also 
point out that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are allowed to and do participate in 
subsequent meetings of the member states. See id. at SOL CITES itself, in Article XI, allows any 
international or national NGO or other organization to participate at regular meetings unless at 
least one-third of the parties present object. CITES, supra note 7, art. XI, 27 U.S.T. at 1105. As a 
practical matter, of course, few countries will object to the World Wide Fund for Nature or the 
Humane Society participating in a conference about animals. CITES also allows the Secretariat 
to enlist NGO's in a variety of duties, such as field studies of animal populations and the efficacy 
of implementation measures. See id., art. XII, 27 U.S.T. at 1106. 
51 See Glennon, supra note 3, at 10, 29-30. Customary international law develops when a 
pattern of practice develops that gives rise to a sense of legal obligation on the part of states. See 
id. at 29-30. Glennon contends that international protection of endangered species is now so 
widely practiced and accepted that it has become customary international law. See id. Customary 
international law also binds states that do not necessarily agree with the custom, or did not exist 
while the custom developed. See infra note 33. 
32 See Sands & Bedecarre, supra note 30, at 800. 
3S See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System. 82 AM.]. INT'L L. 705, 705 
(1988). Customary international law is founded on the idea that all states should participate in 
making decisions about how to resolve global issues. See David M. Parks, GATT and the Environ-
ment: Reconciling Liberal Trade Policies with Environmental Preservation, IS UCLA]. ENVTL. L. & 
POL'y 151, 178 (1996/1997). Therefore, there are disciplinary problems which occur when new 
states are incorporated, like the Slovak Republic, or when states emerge independent after 
imperialism, such as Zimbabwe, into the international legal order. See COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 90-93 (4th ed. 1995). 
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signatories, and may also establish mechanisms through which disputes 
can be addressed. 34 Accordingly, international consensus of the type 
CITES seeks to codify tends to be the best way to preserve global 
resources.35 
When examining any multilateral treaty, it is essential to recognize 
the diversity of opinions held by the different parties; CITES is no 
different. 36 Thus, consensus was attainable only by creating a document 
to which all parties could subscribe.37 It is beyond the scope of this 
book review to conduct an exhaustive review of CITES and its numer-
ous provisions. By way of background, however, it is instructive to look 
at specific articles of the Convention.38 
The Convention's preamble declares that "peoples and states are 
and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna and flora. "39 
Though only hortatory, this statement is an essential part of the Con-
vention; from the first, parties are reminded that the agreement does 
not seek to intrude into domestic affairs.40 
Also important in this regard is the fact that the Convention allows 
states to make reservations.41 Some international agreements do not 
let countries enter reservations, that is, opt out of specific portions of 
the agreement.42 This is the case, for instance, in the UN Convention 
on Genocide, the rationale being that principles enshrined in that 
agreement are so fundamental that states either accept them or not-
there can be no middle ground.43 
34 See Parks, supra note 33, at 155 (discussing obligations on signatories to the GAIT). 
35 See id. at 178. 
36 See id. at 177. 
37 See id.; see also David Favre, Debate Within the CITES Community: What Direction for the 
Future?, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 875, 878 (1993) [hereinafter Favre, Debate Within] (reflecting on 
20 years of CITES and exploring issues that must be considered in the future in order for the 
Convention to maintain effectiveness). 
38 See infra notes 39-88 and accompanying text. 
39 CITES, supra note 7, Preamble, 27 V.S.T. at 1090. The preamble basically reassures parties 
that their national sovereignty will not be compromised once they become parties to CITES. See 
id; infra notes 40-42. 
40 See CITES, supra note 7, art. XIV, 27 V.S.T. at 1108-09. Article XIV of the Convention 
continues in this vein with an extensive disclaimer about the effect of the Treaty in light of existing 
national laws. See id.; Favre, Debate Within, supra note 37, at 891-92. 
41 See CITES, supra note 7, art. XXIII, 27 V.S.T. at 1116. 
42 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
78 V.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; see also Reservations to the Convention on 
Genocide (Advisory Opinion) reprinted in OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 1007-11 [hereinafter 
Advisory Opinion) (opining that if reservations are allowed to the Genocide Treaty, the agree-
ment will be emasculated entirely). 
43 See Advisory Opinion, supra note 42, at 1007-11. 
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CITES, by contrast, is founded on ideas not universally accepted.44 
In addition, the comprehensive treaty took so long to forge that is was 
worthwhile to get as many signatories as possible, even if some uni-
formity was sacrificed in the process.45 Especially in global accords 
that regulate environmental problems, which may transcend national 
boundaries, state sovereignty must be guarded carefully.46 In the case 
of CITES, for example, there is no easy answer as to who should exert 
sovereignty over the peripatetic elephantY Thus, the sort of safeguards 
described above try to guarantee that CITES will be embraced by a 
broad array of nations.48 
Another important aspect of the Convention is its Appendix sys-
tem.49 All wildlife that CITES protects is listed on one of three Appen-
dices.50 While population statistics are an important part of deciding 
how species are listed, they are not the only criterion for determining 
what wildlife will be included in which Appendix.51 Because animals 
and plants are listed at the request of member states, a variety of 
political, economic and social factors figure into the final decision.52 
In addition, as illustrated by the debate over elephants, member 
states can request that species not naturally existing in their country 
nevertheless be listed on one of the Appendices.53 This power seem-
ingly undermines the Convention's language seeking to protect na-
tional sovereignty, for it gives any member state the capacity to mini-
mize another party's ability to govern its own wildlife. 54 In sum, the 
choice of which species should be listed on what Appendix is not as 
44 For example, the Southern African countries hardly think it is appropriate for foreigners 
to act in a way that regulates the trade in ivory. See Botswana Offers Compromise Ivary Proposal, 
Agence France-Presse, June 5,1997, available in 1997 WI.. 2128082 [hereinafter Botswana Offers 
Compromise]. 
45 See Sands & Bedecarre, supra note 30, at 800-01, 805; see also Favre, Debate Within, supra 
note 37, at 891-92 (discussing the fact that states do relinquish sovereignty when becoming parties 
to CITES, an exercise not undertaken lightly). 
46 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw, AND 
SOCIETY 1183-84 (2d ed. 1998). 
47 See Favre, Debate Within, supra note 37, at 891-92. 
48 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 46, at 1204. 
49 See CITES, supra note 7, art. II, 27 U.S.T. at 1092. 
50 See id. at apps. I, II, 27 U.S.T. at 1118--43. For the purposes of this book review, only 
Appendix I and II will be discussed. See id. 
51 See Favre, Risk of Extinction, supra note 29, at 357. 
52 See id. 
53 See CITES, supra note 7, art. XI, 27 U.S.T. at 1105. 
54 See id. 
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easy as it appears and thus, final determinations may not comport 
exactly with the severity of a species' condition.55 
Appendix I includes all species "threatened with extinction. "56 
Thus, trade in products derived from wildlife listed in Appendix I is 
not allowed, save in "exceptional circumstances. "57 To this end, there 
are exceedingly stringent requirements that must be met before trade 
is permitted.58 Under the terms of the recent ivory ban, elephants were 
listed on Appendix I, though at present they have been moved back 
to Appendix II, upon which they were designated originally. 59 
Trade in products from wildlife listed on Appendix II also is strictly 
controlled, though less tightly than Appendix I mandates.60 Species 
listed on Appendix II are not threatened immediately, but could face 
extinction if trade is not regulated closely.61 For instance, individuals 
can engage in trade governed by Appendix II only if they apply to their 
national government for a special permit.62 The permit is conditioned 
upon that government's determination that allowing a limited amount 
of trade will not impede the survival of the species.63 
The Convention also requires parties to provide periodic reports 
to the Secretariat,64 penalize violators,65 and take measures to enforce 
the Convention.66 Like many other international agreements, however, 
CITES does not mandate specific enforcement mechanisms.67 For in-
55 See Favre, Risk of Extinction, supra note 29, at 357. It is easy to envision an American 
politician, trying to earn political capital with the public, positing himself as the defender of 
wildlife by proposing that trade in elephant products be tightly resuicted. See Glennon, supra 
note 3, at 14-15. In fact, it is a no-lose situation: 1) most people support actions designed to help 
elephants, and 2) the politician is not accountable domestically for the decision because it will 
have so little direct effect on the country. See id. 
56CITES, supra note 7, art. II, 27 U.S.T. at 1092. 
57 Id. The reasoning behind this exceedingly resuictive category is that the signers believe 
the well-being of the particular species may be affected by trade. See id. 
58 See id. 
59 See Wildlife (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.sadcreview.com/wildlife.httnl> [hereinaf-
ter Wildlife) (coordinated by Malawi for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Review). 
60 See CITES, supra note 7, art. IV, 27 U.S.T. at 1095; id. art. III, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-94. 
61 See id. art. II, 27 U.S.T. at 1092. 
62 See id. art. IV, 27 U.S.T. at 1095-96. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. art. VIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1103. The reports are supposed to include a list of how many 
trading permits were given out, the reasons the permits were awarded, and all measures taken to 
ensure the survival of the species. See id. 
65 See CITES, supra note 7, art. VIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1101. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
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stance, if the Secretariat believes a member state is failing to comply 
with CITES guidelines, it may inform the state that it is violating the 
agreement.68 Yet the only explicit requirement on the part of the 
respondent is to answer the complaint.69 
Because of such weak enforcement mechanisms, the United States 
and other Western countries have passed domestic legislation targeting 
the perceived problems of the ivory trade.70 This kind of legislation is 
troublesome because the people most affected by the regulations do 
not live in the country implementing the regulations.71 These laws 
therefore usurp sovereignty from other states, albeit indirectly, by de-
ciding how these countries can use their resources. 72 
It was in this vein that Western nations spearheaded the movement 
at COP7 to upgrade elephants from Appendix II to the more restrictive 
Appendix 1.73 Southern Mrican nations objected to the alteration, but 
the elephant was re-assigned nonetheless.74 Because amendments can 
be adopted by a two-thirds majority,75 Western member states were able 
to overcome Mrican protestations.76 Probably because the majority 
necessary to ratify amendments is relatively low, amendments are only 
binding on parties who expressly accede to them.77 Botswana and 
Zimbabwe entered reservations to the ban, indicating when they did 
so that the ban conflicted with their national interests.78 
• 68 See id. art. XIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1107. 
69 See id. This apparent impotence is symptomatic of many international agreements primar-
ily designed to gain as many signatories as possible. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 42, at 
1007-11. An example of this is the Genocide Convention. See Genocide Convention, supra note 
42, 78 U.N.T.S. at 277. 
70In October 1988, the U.S. enacted the African Elephant Conservation Act, which created 
an almost absolute ban on the import of elephant ivory. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-45 (1998). 
71 See Parks, supra note 33, at 171. But see Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and En-
vironment Debate: In Search of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
1279, 1293 (1992) (arguing that because CITES and other such agreements lack strong enforce-
ment mechanism, "[elxtraterritorial regulation is ... critical in protecting endangered and 
threatened species"). 
72 See Storey, supra note 21, at 377; Dunoff, supra note 10, at 1424. 
75 See Favre, Debate Within, supra note 37, at 877. 
74 See id. 
75 See CITES, supra note 7, art. XV, 27 U.S. T. at 1110. 
76The move towards the ban had begun at earlier COP meetings. See Importation, supra 
note 5, at 19417. In 1981 and 1985, the parties enacted additional measures to regulate the trade 
in ivory more stringently. See id. 
77 See CITES, supra note 7, arts. XV-XVII, at 1l1~14. 
78 See Favre, Debate Within, supra note 37, at 877. While reservations weaken the potency of 
the Convention, they may make the agreement more palatable to governments which like 
knowing that they can choose not to accede to certain portions of the agreement. See CITES, 
supra note 7, art. XXIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1116; Sands & Bedecarre, supra note 30, at 805. Namibia 
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Nonetheless, these countries, and Namibia when it became a party 
to the Convention, generally abided by the ban.79 Although CITES' 
formal enforcement mechanisms are weak, parties can capitalize on 
consensus, such as that achieved during the amendment process, to 
mobilize international opinion against parties that do not agree to 
certain principles.80 The possibility of this type of backlash is an effec-
tive way to discourage violations of the ban.81 
It is clear that CITES provides a framework within which to ad-
dress the problems of threatened species.82 In this regard, it creates a 
useful forum in which national governments and NGOs can voice 
concerns about particular wildlife or country practices.83 The Conven-
tion's weakness lies in how easily it can be subverted.84 For one, it lacks 
formal enforcement mechanisms, so violations are difficult to curb. 85 
In addition, it is not insulated effectively from capricious, political 
decisions about how to categorize different species.86 While it did help 
reduce the price of ivory, at least in the short-term, CITES by itself has 
done little to curb interest in ivory.87 Most importantly, it has failed to 
unite Western states with the southern Mrican countries that have the 
most at stake in the ivory trade.88 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE IVORY BAN 
Working from the premise that CITES by itself is not enough, the 
question becomes how the international community best can protect 
elephants.89 Even accepting the argument that the ivory ban enacted 
did not become a party to the Convention until 1991. See Favre, Debate Within, supra note 37, at 
877 n.ll. 
79 See Whose Elephants Are They Anyway?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1994, at 46 [hereinafter Whose 
Elephantsl. 
80 See David A. Martin, How Rhetoric Became Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1998, at C2 (describ-
ing how the Universal Declaration on Human Rights developed from a mere hortatory statement 
into an international obligation). 
81 See id. 
82 See generally Sands & Bedecarre, supra note 30, at 800-05. 
83 See id. 
84 See infra notes 85-86. 
85 See CITES, supra note 7, art. XIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1107. 
86 See Favre, Risk of Extinction, supra note 29, at 357. 
87 See Storey, supra note 21, at 375-77. 
88 See Favre, Debate Within, supra note 37, at 877. 
89 See Storey, supra note 21, at 396; see also New Ways to Run the World, ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 
1991, at 11 [hereinafter New Waysl (discussing the difficulty of dealing with environmental 
degradation in countries which do not share, necessarily, Western ideas about wildlife preserva-
tion) . 
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under CITES was an effective way to protect elephant populations, 
it nonetheless proved a poor paradigm through which to establish 
healthy, sustainable relationships between elephants, the environment 
and the nations in which the creatures dwell.90 
This problem has been a persistent predicament for southern 
Africa since independence.91 Trying to establish their own autonomy, 
but also relying on Western assistance, these states have struggled to 
placate all stakeholders.92 As Casto's book points out, "[t]he bidding 
war ... over spheres of influence became a serious handicap to the 
rational development of sub-Saharan Africa."93 This battle is apparent 
in the debate about elephant preservation, for Western suggestions are 
influential, but not always reasonable.94 
The fact is that ivory is highly sought-after.95 Elephant hunting, 
and the subsequent trade in ivory, can be exceedingly lucrative, espe-
cially in underdeveloped areas where elephants tend to live.96 The 
money to be made from trading even a modicum of ivory greatly 
outweighs the average salary most Africans earn during the course of 
a year.97 In this economically deprived environment, it is not surprising 
that poaching, with or without the existence of a ban, is a common 
occurrence.98 
Despite this reality, the United States led the way towards a total 
ban, hailing it as the only solution to burgeoning totals of elephant 
deaths.99 Great Britain and France soon followed the American lead,lOo 
as did the European Community on the whole. lOl 
Interestingly, the call for a ban was echoed by a number of African 
countries, including Kenya. 102 Though a sizable number of elephants 
! 
90 See Storey, supra note 21, at 396-97. 
91 See CASTO, supra note 13, at 265. 
92 See id. 
93Id. 
94 See Storey, supra note 21, at 396-98. 
95 See Glennon, supra note 3, at 20. 
96 See Storey, supra note 21, at 378. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See U.S., Trying to Protect Elephants, Declares Ban on All Ivory Imports, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
1989, at A18. 
100 See European Community Bans Import of Ivory, N.Y. TIMEs,June 11, 1989, at A21. 
101 See Commission Regulation 2496/89 of 2 August 1989 on a Prohibition on Importing Raw 
and Worked Ivory Derived from the African Elephant into the Community, 1989 OJ. (L 240) 5, 
5. As the regulation stated, "most ivory is traded outside [the ivory quota] system and illegal and 
excessive taking of elephants continues to take place at unsustainable levels." Id. 
102 See Glennon, supra note 3, at 15-16. One likely reason Kenya supported the trade ban is 
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still reside in Kenya, the country's elephant population has been rav-
aged by poachers. 103 In fact, in a 1989 demonstration against the ivory 
trade, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi burned stock-piles of ivory 
valued at several million dollars. lo4 
The terse ideological conflict described in Casto's booklO5 was 
given shape when the ivory ban was approved, in 1989, over objections 
and reservations of southern Mrican nations.I06 Initially, the ban 
worked almost too well. I07 The price of ivory dropped significantly, 
which, in turn, made trading and marketing less lucrative.108 Elephant 
populations increased across Southern Mrica, after falling during the 
previous fifteen years. 109 In some cases the resurgence was actually too 
great for the land to sustain.IIO 
Mter this initial decline in ivory prices, however, prices rose again 
towards pre-ban levels.1I1 By the 1994 Conference of the Parties 
(COP9), Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe were threatening to ignore 
CITES and resume trading ivory to fund elephant conservation pro-
jects.112 Considering that these nations had entered reservations to the 
original ban, this threat easily, and legally, could have been carried 
out. m In the end, they chose to comply with CITES, but did not 
abandon their desire to end the ban.1I4 
because, unlike southern African countries which have had minimal trouble with poachers, Kenya 
has experienced significant problems with poaching. See id; Storey, sufrra note 21, at 379. Evidence 
suggests poachers began in the northern part of the continent, then slowly proceeded south. See 
Storey, sUfrra note 21, at 379. Furthermore, vast, unpopulated expanses of land in nations like 
Kenya make it difficult for countries to police their territory. See Editorial, Act on Renewed 
Poaching Threat, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Feb. 17, 1998 [hereinafter Renewed Poaching Threat]. 
lOS See Storey, supra note 21, at 379-80. 
104 See Andrew J. Heimert, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE LJ. 1473,1486 (1995). 
105 See CASTO, sUfrra note 13, at 265. 
106 See Sands & Bedecarre, sUfrra note 30, at 799-800. 
107 See The Ivory Paradox: KiUing the Trade in Tusks Cuuld Wipe out the Elephant, Too, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1991, at 16 [hereinafter Ivory Paradox]; Storey, sUfrra note 21, at 375-76. 
108 See Storey, supra note 21, at 376. 
109 See Importation, sUfrra note 5, at 19417; Sustaining the Elephant: Easing the Ban on Ivory 
Sales Is Worth Trying, SACRAMENTO BEE (California),june 26,1997, at B6 [hereinafter Sustaining 
the Elephant]. 
110 See Sustaining the Elephant, sufrra note 109. Because of these growing populations, ele-
phants have caused human, agricultural and property damages. See id. 
III See Namibia CITES Factsheet (visited Sept. 22, 1998) <http://www.wildnetafrica.co.za/ 
cites/info/135_01l_namibiafacts.htrnl> [hereinafter Namibia Factsheet]. 
112 See mwse Elephants, supra note 79, at 46. 
mSeeCITES, supra note 7, art. XV, 27 U.S.T. at 1110. 
114 See Sustaining the Elephant, sufrra note 109. The ethical problem with CITES is that it 
looks suspiciously like imperialism. See New Ways, sufrra note 89, at 11; Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, 
Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intel-
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With Mrican leaders bemoaning what they viewed as neo-imperi-
alism, and Western activists contending that Mrican officials already 
were involved in illicit ivory trading, the stage was set for the 1997 
Conference of the Parties (COPlO).115 Prior to the meeting, Botswan.a, 
joined by Namibia and Zimbabwe, had proposed a one-time sale, to 
one customer, of stock-piled ivory. 116 These countries argued that, hav-
ing managed their elephants effectively, they should be rewarded. lI7 
They also suggested that substantial revenue to be gained from a 
one-time sale could be pumped back into elephant conservation pro-
grams. lIB To allay Western skepticism, Botswana's government prom-
ised the country would only sell ivory which had already been collected 
from elephants that had attacked villagersY9 
Despite Western objections, CITES member states voted to lift the 
ivory ban. 120 Since then, interested parties have carefully followed re-
ports of poaching.121 In Kenya, for instance, recent elephant deaths 
have some observers worried that poachers once again are on the 
lectual Property Protection, 6 IND.]. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 20-21 (1998) [hereinafter Aoki, 
Neocolcnialism] (discussing particularly the field of intellectual property and strategies employed 
by developed nations that effectively coerce developing states to adhere to Western norms); see 
also Turtle Soup, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 88 (discussing need to balance measures aimed at 
protecting endangered species with the necessity of engaging in fair trade practices). 
115 See Sustaining the Elephant, supra note 109. Ironically, COPIO took place in Harare, the 
capital of Zimbabwe. See Emmanuel Koro, Zimbabwe: Early Calls to Reverse CITES Decision on 
Elephants, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5985401. 
116 See Botswana Offers Compromise, supra note 44. About a year prior to the Conference, the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) , of which Botswana is a member, had issued 
a declaration in which it supported Botswana's proposal, now joined by N~ibia and Zimbabwe. 
See Resolution on a SADC Common Position on the African Elephant for CITES COP10 (visited Sept. 
22, 1998) <http://wildnetafrica.co.za/cites/info/iss_017 _sadc.html>. The resolution acknow-
ledged the need to preserve the elephant as a valuable world resource and the importance of 
sustainable development, but it also emphasized the right of SADC members to derive benefits 
from responsible utilization of their national resources. See ill. To this end, the resolution 
supported altering the elephant's status from Appendix I to Appendix II and exploring ways to 
take advantage of stock-piled ivory. See id. This highlights the central debate between Western 
and African governments; in the eyes of Africans elephants are a resource while Westerners view 
them as the world's possession. See "Whose Elephants, supra note 79, at 46. 
117 See Botswana Offers Compromise, supra note 44. 
liB See ill. 
119 See ill. 
120 See Restrictions on Ivory Trade Eased, FRESNO BEE (California), June 20, 1997, at A14 
[hereinafter Ivory TradeEasetlj. Interestingly, nearly 75% of member states agreed with Botswana 
that the ban should be eased. See id. 
121 See Renewed Poaching Threat, supra note 102; Kenya Elephant Poaching Rising After Ban 
Lifted, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), July 28, 1998, at 30A [hereinafter Poaching Rising]; 
Elephant Poaching on Rise, Says Group, ST. LoUIS PosT-DISPATCH, Nov. 7, 1997, at B8. 
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prowl in search of tusks. 122 Conversely, most southern Mrican countries 
believe increased reports of poaching are fabricated and are intended 
only as a way to ignite animal activists' emotions.123 
The debate continues. Animal rights groups highlight the fact 
that, in contrast to Southern Mrica Development Community (SADC) 
members who proposed lifting the ban, the other twenty-eight Mrican 
nations which are parties to CITES support the ban.124 While true, this 
argument is somewhat disingenuous: first, some of these twenty-eight 
nations, such as Kenya and Sudan, wanted to get involved in the trade 
of ivory in 1994; second, none of these other states have the type of 
elephant populations that roam southern Mrica and, thus, are not as 
directly affected by the ban.125 
Activists also claim that local populations are harmed more than 
helped by the ivory trade.126 Yet this, too, is misleading.127 Unquestion-
ably, the ivory trade traditionally has been unregulated and chaotic.128 
Substantial money has been earned by poachers, while little benefit 
has accrued in local communities.129 The more systematic approach 
adopted at COP10 inverts this situation--governments maintain con-
trol of revenues gained from ivory so that local communities can 
benefit from the trade. ISO In addition, this approach creates a more 
equitable way of distributing power within CITES.ISI 
122 See Poaching Rising, supra note 121. The situation in Kenya is particularly difficult because 
of the size of the country and the inaccessibility of many areas inhabited by elephants. See Renewed 
Poaching Threat, supra note 102. 
12S See Koro, supra note 115. 
124 See generaUy The Case Against Commercial Trade in Elephant Products (visited September 
22, 1998) <http://www/wildnetafrica.co.za/cites/info/iss_007 _elearguments.html> [hereinaf-
ter Case Against Commercial TradeJ. 
125 See id. Because poachers apparently began in the northern part of the continent and 
moved south, northern African countries which support CITES differ in perspective from the 
southern African countries that comprise SADC. See id. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See Case Against Commercial Trade, supra note 124. 
ISO See Namibia Factsheet, supra note Ill. 
m See Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Suvereignties: Liberalism, Libertarian-
ism, National Suvereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 443, 465 (1998) (discussing the need to allocate power between north and south more 
evenly in international intellectual property agreements). Though every member's vote is equal, 
international agreements such as CITES tend to show a marked bias toward the interests of the 
Western parties. See id. The continuing reliance of the developing world on the West, namely the 
U.S. and Europe, enables Western parties to use trade restrictions to acquire what they want 
through coercion. See Editorial, Rich Men's Rules, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 1999, at 15. 
Another justification for lifting this ban is exemplified in this type of behavior. See Shortcomings 
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Easing or lifting the ban is risky, bu tit is a risk worth taking. 132 The 
danger is also being minimized by the limited, careful way in which 
the ban is being eased.133 Because of these limits, it is unlikely that the 
ivory trade will develop into a race to the bottom.134 If there is a 
resurgence of poaching and elephant slaughter, the experiment can 
be ended.135 
III. METHODS OF MANAGING ELEPHANTS 
The re-introduction of the ivory trade is a positive step forward in 
the attempt to create an environment in which elephants and humans 
can co-exist peacefully. In contrast to the ban, a strictly-controlled ivory 
trade provides an effective way for nations to benefit from elephants, 
which are, after all, a national resource. 136 Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the revokation of the ban serves as a reminder to the West that 
their policies are not always appropriate in Mrica. 137 In the past, as 
Casto acknowledges, the West has taken little responsibility for failed 
efforts to bring positive management to Mrica. 138 A successfully oper-
ated elephan t ivory trade may force the West to recognize the inade-
quacy of its earlier responses to the situation. 139 
Yet the trade will work, and revenue generated from elephants 
will multiply, only if elephant populations are sustained responsibly.140 
These are massive creatures, so managing them is exceedingly dif-
ficult. HI Because of population pressures, elephant terrain increasingly 
includes human habitats.142 As a result, elephants cause extensive inju-
Involving CITES (visited Sept. 21, 1998) http://ps.ucdavis.edu/classes/po1l22/UGA/mindiv.h 
unl>. 
132 See Sustaining the Elephant, supra note 109. 
mSee id.; see also Ivary Trade Ban is Eased, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 1999, at 7 
(reporting that ban was eased to help generate funds for community development projects). 
134 See Ivury Trade Eased, supra note 120. 
135 See Sustaining the Elephant, supra note 109. One development that should enable the ivory 
trade to be more transparent is technology which gives different types of ivory a distinctive 
"signature." See Poached? Moi?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1990, at 92. In addition, states are improving 
internal monitoring methods, both in terms of managing their own ivory products, and ensuring 
that ivory they have exported was obtained legally. See Storey, supra note 21, at 386-87. 
136 See supra Part II. 
m See CASTO, supra note 13, at 270. 
us See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See Sustaining the Elephant, supra note 109. 
141 See Tracey C. Rembert, opening the Ivury Dour, EARTH ACTION NETWORK NEWSLETTER 
(Earth Action Network, Inc.) ,July 1,1998, available in 1998 WI.. 16883687; Poaching Rising, supra 
note 12l. 
142 See id. This situation is not unlike those in other parts of the world where animals and 
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ries to humans, property and crops each year. 143 In Namibia, for in-
stance, less than one percent of the country receives enough rain each 
year to sustain agriculture. 144 Only a few areas in the country, therefore, 
can support wildlife, people and cropS.145 
African states seem to recognize the value of preservation-they 
have signed conservation treaties, initiated conservation programs, 
and developed eco-tourism projects. 146 The more pressing question is 
whether the African people who share habitat with elephants realize the 
importance of preservation. 147 Most policy-makers agree that the only 
way to relieve the strain between humans and elephants is to convince 
local people that preserving elephants is economically beneficial. 148 
There are a number of ideas about how best to pursue a sustain-
able program of elephant preservation. 149 The four primary methods 
are discussed below.150 
humans have trouble co-existing. See The Question Rio Furgets, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 11 
(detailing global population pressures). 
143 See Rembert, sUfrra note 141. Land distribution is a troubling issue throughout Africa 
because most fertile land was extricated from African control by colonial leaders. See]. Oloka· 
Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigurating the Struggle fur Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 
26 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 1, 40 (1995). It is beyond the scope of this Note to try and explicate, or 
make suggestions about how to rectify, African land ownership problems. Suffice it to say here 
that parsimonious colonial rulers were not particularly generous to Africans when dividing up 
land. See Reform in Year Two; South Africa's President De Klerk Must Resist the Temptation to Bypass 
the Disurganised ANC, ECONOMIST, Jan. 26, 1991, at 14 (highlighting the fact that Africans 
traditionally have been excluded from most land in South Africa); see also Gordon, sufrra note 
12, at 907 n.12, 909 (exploring the effects of colonial occupation on African societies and 
economies) . 
141 See CASTO, sUfrra note 13, at 137. Namibia is about twice the size of California. Id. 
145 See id. 
146 See Rembert, sUfrra note 141 (discussing measures taken by Zimbabwe); see also Heimert, 
sUfrra note 104, at 1486-88 (detailing Kenyan efforts to preserve elephant populations). 
147 See Storey, sUfrra note 21, at 390. Unfortunately, Western groups frequently devise policies 
and regulations without taking account of the applicability of their ideas in a foreign context. See 
Oloka-Onyango, sUfrra note 143, at 60-62. This is not just a problem in Africa; for instance, in 
Colombia, the U.S. has placed enormous pressure on the government to continue with a program 
designed to eradicate illegal plants used in the manufacture of drugs. See Vanessa Diago Garcia, 
Innocent Victims of War in the Air, World Wide Fund for Nature Features (visited Oct. 2, 1998) 
<http://www.panda.org/news/features/story.cfm?id=113>. Though existing herbicides have 
been shown to harm people, crops and the environment, the U.S. wants herbicidal spraying to 
continue with even stronger chemicals. See id. 
148 See Don L. Coursey, The Revealed Demand fur a Public Good: Evidence from Endangered and 
Threatened Species, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 411, 412 (1998). Coursey's logical argument points out 
that animals are not susceptible to protection from all parties unless some type of monetary 
incentive is included in the bargain. See id. 
149 See Storey, sUfrra note 21, at 381-95. Sustainability is rooted in the importance of using 
resources responsibly, and in a manner that will preserve them effectively. See Wildlife, sUfrra note 
59. 
150 See Rembert, sUfrra note 141; Storey, sUfrra note 21, at 381-88; infra Part III at §§ A-D. 
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A. Fencing 
Some governments protect sought-after animals by erecting fences 
around animal habitats, as is done in national parks, for example. 151 
The Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) is a leader in this effort, having 
created a number of enclosed areas in which to maintain elephants as 
well as other threatened species like rhinoceroses.152 Fencing is effec-
tive because it segregates these animals from humans while limiting 
the area that rangers must patrol. I53 In addition, fencing may benefit 
eco-tourism companies because it increases the chance that high-pay-
ing sightseers will be able to view the big game animals they are paying 
to see. 154 
One drawback to fencing is its COSt.155 Even if that hurdle can be 
overcome, fencing diminishes animals' freedom of movement, an es-
sential part of their, and the environment's, survival. 156 When local 
populations are separated from one another, as can occur with fencing, 
the animals tend to inbreed, an activity that decreases the survival rate 
of the species.157 Moreover, when animals are not allowed to disperse 
over their natural, broad territory, the damage they inflict on the land 
is greater. 15S While fencing may be useful for protecting some endan-
gered species, it is not practical as a means to preserve the corpulent 
elephant.159 
151 See Storey, sujrra note 21, at 383-84. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. Because Kenya's elephant population is smaller than those of other African coun-
tries, the country understandably is concerned with preserving its existing population. See id. at 
379. 
154 See Heimert, sujrra note 104, at 1497 (implying that Kenya relies on tourism as its primary 
means of benefitting from elephants). 
155 See id. at 1487. 
156 See Road Kill, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1998, at 82 [hereinafter Road Kill]. As one authority 
points out, degradation of animal habitat is probably the main cause of animal extinction, more 
destructive than even hunting. See PLATER ET AL., sujrra note 46, at 673. 
157 See Road Kill, sujrra note 156, at 82. 
158 See id. 
159 See Storey, sujrra note 21, at 383-84; see also Glennon, sujrra note 3, at 1 (citing CYNTHIA 
Moss, ELEPHANT MEMORIES: THIRTEEN YEARS IN THE LIFE OF AN ELEPHANT FAMILY 103, 123 
(1988) (stating that elephants grow for their entire life, and eat approximately 300 pounds of 
food per day». 
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B. Eco-Tourism 
Eco-tourism actually includes two concepts: 1) game-viewing safa-
ris160 and 2) big-game hunting. 161 The first of these, game-viewing, is 
promoted as a way to generate significant revenues from elephants 
without having to exterminate them. 162 Unfortunately, game-viewing is 
not always an option for African nations because of the rugged terrain 
in which wildlife often dwells. 163 Poor infrastructure frequen tly makes 
it difficult to access areas distant from national capitals. 164 In addition, 
companies that stage safaris usually are based in cities and, thus, have 
little or no connection with local communities. 165 
Big-game hunting is not legal in all countries, but where allowed 
it can be lucrative, for the permits required to hunt game are expen-
sive. 166 Like game-viewing, however, hunting generally does not greatly 
benefit local communities. 167 Many companies are run by foreigners, 
and so revenue may bypass local coffers. 168 
Eco-tourism is valuable as a way to bring substantial revenue, 
especially in the form of hard, foreign currency, into the country.169 In 
addition, it is an effective way to publicize the plight of elephants.170 
160 "Safari" is the Swahili word for trip. See MARTIN BENJAMIN ET AL., SWAHILI PHRASEBOOK 
215 (2d ed. 1998). 
161 See Favre, Risk of Extinction, supra note 29, at 354, 362 (discussing Malawi and its sports-
hunting industry). 
162 See Glennon, supra note 3, at 9 n.67; Killing to Be Kind: lVhy we Ought to Hunt Big Animals, 
ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 76 [hereinafter Killing to Be Kincl]. 
163 See Anita Manning, A Call far Changes in Conservation EjJarts, USA TODAY, May 18, 1993, 
at 4D (interview with Raymond Bonner); Storey, supra note 21, at 393. 
164 See MICHAEL BARRATT BROWN, AFRICA'S CHOICES: AFTER THIRTY YEARS OF THE WORLD 
BANK 233 (1995) (stating that because of corruption and the rise of the informal sector, African 
states have been unable to provide even the most basic resources which nascent enterprises need 
to flourish). 
165 See Christof Maletsky, Namibia; IUgional 'Spin' far Tourism, NAMIBIAN (Windhoek), Aug. 
14, 1998, available in Lexis, News Library, News Group File. 
166 See Killing to Be Kind, supra note 162, at 76. 
167 See id. (stating that many hunters take pains to avoid the people and cultures of the locales 
in which they hunt); see also Rembert, supra note 141 (noting that a number of families in 
Zimbabwe have been displaced by hunting ventures). 
168 See Rob Taylor, Kilimanjaro Pam's Plan Serves as Model of New Approaches to Conservation-
ism, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 23, 1997, at Dl (depicting Masai tribesmen's view that 
tourists are "cattle" from the cities and abroad); see also A New Scramble, ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 
1995, at 17 (discussing the efforts of South Mrican whites to expand operations into the rest of 
Africa) . 
169 See Killing to Be Kind, supra note 162, at 76. 
170 See Willis, supra note 3 (describing computer link used to track elephant populations in 
Cameroon). 
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Eco-tourism is, therefore, an important resource upon which southern 
Mrican countries must continue to capitalize. 171 
By the same token, its strength is its weakness; that is, eco-tourism 
relies too heavily on foreigners. 172 Safaris are so costly that most Afri-
cans can not afford them.173 While eco-tourism is profitable, it generally 
does not benefit local communities and thereby lacks the ability to 
engage them meaningfully in the conservation process. I74 
C. CAMPFIRE 
The Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Re-
sources (CAMPFIRE) was launched in Zimbabwe in 1989.175 Initiated 
as a response to poaching, the program lets local communities decide 
how to manage elephant populations in their area. 176 Revenue usually 
is earned through the sale of hunting permits.177 This money then is 
injected back into the community to build schools and roads, and to 
further educate people about managing elephants effectively.178 Be-
cause CAMPFIRE gives locals a vested interest in the sustainability of 
the elephant population, a number of conservation groups support the 
program. 179 
CAMPFIRE is flawed, however, in that its benefits are not distrib-
uted universally. ISO Some communities have profited, but others have 
not.181 Though under CAMPFIRE local communities may control hunt-
ing permits, trophy-hunting operations control the flow of hunters. 182 
171 See Killing to Be Kind, supra note 162, at 76. 
172 See id. (highlighting the fact that most tourists are foreign); see also Meet Max, a 190-kilo 
Crimebuster, ECONOMIST,July 11, 1998, at 83 [hereinafter Meet Max) ("The luxurious game lodges 
in Botswana's Okavango delta ... generally have no local customers at all. The average Kenyan 
does not earn in a week what elderly Europeans on a balloon safari over the Masai Mara spend 
on tumblers of whisky at sundown."). 
173 See Meet Max, supra note 172, at 83. Ail the article points out, "[s) afari holidays are 
wonderful, but they are beyond the means of most Africans." Id. By contrast, zoos are inexpensive 
and easily accessible for the numerous Africans who live in cities. See id. 
174 See Taylor, supra note 168. 
175 See Rembert, supra note 141. 
176 See id. Since CAMPFIRE was begun, Zimbabwe's elephant population has nearly doubled, 
while illegal poaching has been reduced drastically. See id. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See Rembert, supra note 141. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
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As a result, a number of villages have been razed in favor of hunting 
lodges.18s 
Paradoxically, CAMPFIRE may devolve too much power to local 
communities, thereby weakening the national government's ability 
to control elephant populations.184 Programs such as CAMPFIRE are 
well-intended and can work effectively, but only if regulated in a man-
ner that guarantees all communities affected by elephants benefit 
equally. 185 
D. Culling 
CAMPFIRE, in essence, is an indirect method of managing ani-
mals through culling.186 While the ethical ramifications of deciding to 
kill elephants are troubling, 187 government-controlled culling nonethe-
less provides the best method by which to benefit from the sale of ivory, 
control population numbers and ensure the elephant'S continued ex-
istence.188 
Notwithstanding concerns abOl,lt state corruption, there are sev-
eral reasons to be optimistic about culling.189 First, it is lucrative.190 
Selling ivory acquired from culling elephants will provide needed 
resources that can be used to build up local communities and national 
wildlife ranger forces. 191 As opposed to CAMPFIRE, where money only 
accumulates in specific local communities, revenue earned from cull-
ing will go to the national government, which can ensure it will be 
spent where most needed.192 Because of the profitability of trading 
ivory, governments will have added incentives to protect the elephants 
and ensure localland-owners do not act unilaterally.19s Simultaneously, 
land-owners will see the value of preservation if money comes back into 
their community, and, therefore, be more willing to help safeguard 
elephants, and police against poachers.194 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See SUfrra notes 175-84. 
186 See Storey, supra note 21, at 381. 
187 See id. at 380 (referring to comments made by former head of the Kenya Wildlife Service). 
188 See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1482-86. 
189 See id. 
190 See CASTO, supra note 13, at 147. 
191 See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1485. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. at 1505-06. 
194 See id. at 1505. Even if corruption precludes all of the money from reaching local 
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The second reason culling should work is because of its strict 
regulatory nature, which lessens the likelihood that a new market will 
be opened in illegal ivory.195 Conversely, other methods of preserving 
elephant populations probably would promote an illegal trade in ivory 
because they do not take effective account of the demand for the 
material. 196 Many conservationists, however, are suspicious; they believe 
re-opening the ivory trade, even in a limited capacity, will re-ignite an 
illegal international trade in ivory.197 Casto, no doubt, would share this 
concern and worry that governments would use this new freedom to 
manipulate ivory and revenues for selfish purposes.198 
Admittedly, governments can abuse these new trading privileges.199 
For instance, nations may overestimate their elephant populations in 
order to justify killing more of the animals, and thereby gain more 
ivory.2oo Yet a prescient government should realize such manipulation 
is foolish. 201 Failure to recognize this likely will have political repercus-
sions.202 Mter all, too much culling will eliminate a valuable resource 
from which significant revenue can be earned.20ll In addition, a policy 
communities, as long as the bulk of it does the exercise will be worthwhile. See Namibia Factsheet, 
supra note Ill. In truth, if revenue from ivory sales is employed to bolster national police forces, 
there may not be a need for local policing efforts. See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1484. 
195 See Namibia Factsheet, supra note Ill. 
196 See Heimerl, supra note 104, at 1486-88. Despite some reasonable ideas underlying the 
ivory ban, the lack of resources to enforce it makes it likely that poaching and bribery will 
continue, and thereby vitiate the effectiveness of the ban. See id. 
197 See Case Against Commercial Trade, supra note 124. 
198 See CASTO, supra note 13, at 266. 
199 See generaUy Simon Coldham, Legal Responses to State Curruption in Commonwealth Africa, 
39 J. AFR. L. 115 (1995). 
200 See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1499. 
201 See ill. 
202 This may be an overly optimistic appraisal of how effectively sub-Saharan Aftican electoral 
systems function. See, e.g., William Wallis & Michael Holman, The Path to the Presidency, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Feb. 27, 1999, at 6 (describing an abundance of irregularities in the Nigerian electoral 
system). It is, nevertheless, better to leave control of elephants in the hands of a national 
government. See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1499-1500. They better represent the will of their 
people-those affected by elephants--than do Western governments and NGOs. See Marina 
Ottaway, Keep Out of Africa, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 25, 1999, at 14 (opining that Westerners 
should leave Aftica alone to solve its own problems); Editorial, Africa'S Poison, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Mar. 3, 1999, at 13 (arguing that the Western world should intervene less frequently 
in Aftica, and let those states tackle their own problems). 
203There are those who are cynical about the ability of Aftican governments to manage their 
resources effectively. See CASTO, supra note 13, at 270. Yet even these commentators should admit 
that a strictly regulated program gives countries the incentive to manage elephant populations 
carefully. See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1486. Mter all, the more responsible a government is, 
the greater its benefit from the ivory trade will be. See id. Another possible advantage of culling 
is that sharp-shooters can target sick animals, and thereby improve the quality of the game visitors 
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of limited ivory trade derived from the tusks of culled elephants takes 
advantage of a fact that all parties concede-the ivory market is un lim-
ited.204 Consumers, therefore, will be provided for, whether by legal or 
illegal means. 205 
Culling should work because "economics is the basic foundation 
of the program. "206 By simply balancing the costs of enforcing a ban, 
with the rewards derived from the ban, the merit of culling becomes 
clear.207 The cost of enforcing the ban is the losses local and national 
communities suffer because they can not earn maximum profit from 
elephants.208 These losses are compounded by money spent on internal 
policing of the trade, and of the animals themselves.209 These are 
sizable monetary losses, which can be justified only by an overall 
economic benefit. 210 Yet there are no financial advantages to enforcing 
the ban, espiecially on the micro-economic communal level where 
removal of the ban would be most welcomed.2l1 
CONCLUSION 
When a moratorium on the trade of ivory was initiated in 1989, 
proponents of the ban claimed it would reduce poaching and rejuve-
nate elephant populations.212 It did, a fact that has been misconstrued 
get to see or hunt. See CASTO, supra note 13, at 149 (discussing a culling operation and the skill 
of the sharp-shooters who do the culling). Because of the cost of safaris, this additional guarantee 
would make the country a more desirable place for tourists to visit and spend money. See Meet 
Max, supra note 172, at 83. 
204 See Case Against Commercial Trade, supra note 124. This reveals one of the illogical notions 
of the animal activists' arguments. See id. If there is unlimited interest in elephant ivory, how will 
a ban quench it? See id. More probably, a ban will make people take increasingly desperate 
measures to acquire it. See Glennon, supra note 3, at 15-16 (citing animal rights groups who 
worried that, in the weeks before the ban went into effect, poachers would take drastic actions 
to accumulate ivory prior to the commencement of the ban). 
205 See Case Against Commercial Trade, supra note 124. 
206CAsTO, supra note 13, at 147 (quoting Namibian conservation official in charge of one 
of the country's culling operations). 
207 See Richard A. Epstein, The Mural and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground Economy, 103 
YALE LJ. 2157, 2167 (1994). 
208 See id. 
209 See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1487. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. at 1491. Presumably, national governments earned international political capital 
by adhering to the ban, but it is less clear what local communities pestered by elephants gained 
from the exercise. See Sustaining the Elephant, supra note 109. As a result, the ban led to a perverse 
tragedy of the commons because it instigated over-management of an area to the detriment of the 
local community. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 46, at 16-20 (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy 
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE, 13 Dec. 1968, 1243-48) (emphasis added). 
212 See News Release of U.S. Department of Interior (D.O.!,) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
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to mean that a ban is the only way to protect elephants.213 Actually, 
what the ban's success demonstrates is that strict regulation is the key 
to safeguarding elephant populations.214 And, while careful guidelines 
may salvage elephant populations, they should not be considered suc-
cessful unless they also benefit states and communities that live with 
the elephants.215 Of course, in attempting to preserve something many 
consider a global resource, problems arise if a local community makes 
management choices that are incompatible with international be-
liefs.216 Even more troubling, however, is when well-funded global ac-
tors dictate how local communities should act.217 
L. Dalton Casto, in his boo~ The Dilemmas of Africanization: Choices 
and Dangers for SulrSaharan Africa, seizes upon this tension and depicts 
the way it plays out across southern Mrica.218 Implicit in his analysis is 
a belief that Mrican governments are too concerned with the short-
term and, therefore, are unwilling to tackle difficult decisions that 
could bring lasting political, economic and societal gains.219 He thus 
questions how effectively Mricans can control their own resources in 
the absence of Western intervention.22o 
Undoubtedly, elephants are a global resource, yet more cogently, 
they are a national resource.221 The debate over the ivory ban pits 
traditional conservation models of preservation at all costs against a 
African Elephant to Remain Listed as Threatened: Conservation Efforts Prove Efftctive, Aug. 10, 1992, 
available in 1992 WL 193633. Ironically, and somewhat hypocritically, the U.S. still allows trade 
in ivory that was acquired by hunters or that was imported prior to the ban. See id. 
215 See id. 
214 See Heimert, supra note 104, at 1487 (contending that even less effective means of 
preserving elephants, such as protective fencing, can work if well -organized). 
215 See Ivory Paradox, supra note 107, at 16; Heimert, supra note 104, at 1489. 
216 See Storey, supra note 21, at 390. 
217 See id.; New Ways, supra note 89, at 11; see also Onno de Beaufort Wijnholds, Maintaining 
an Indispensable Role, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. I, 1999, at 16 (explicating why developing 
countries borrowing from the IMF should accede to the Fund's demands: "[conditions imposed 
by the Fund] provide the best hope of ... improvement in the borrowing countr[y]"). 
218 See CASTO, supra note 13, at 271. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 273. 
221 See Wildlife, supra note 59 (referring to elephants and other wildlife that dwell in southern 
Africa as national resources). Some resources, such as the air and ocean water, arguably are 
outside the jurisdiction of anyone country and are somewhat amenable to global administration. 
See Dunoff, supra note 10, at 1408. Yet land-dwelling, highly-mobile elephants do not fit into this 
sort of category. See Manning, supra note 163. If elephants are to be seen as a global resource, 
then presumably, American wildlife would fall into the same category. See id. The U.S. Forest 
Service, therefore, now should take orders from Zimbabwe about how to allocate land to the 
lumber industry. See id. 
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more realistic view of preserving both human and animal habitats. 222 
The critical question about CITES, therefore, concerns state sover-
eignty, a point underscored during preparation for the vote to lift the 
ivory ban at COPIO, where "acrimonious debate . . . showed wide 
. philosophical rifts between Mrica and the wealthy nations of Europe 
and America over issues such as sovereignty, international conservation 
standards and economic development. "223 One commentator, who sub-
scribes to the traditional view of conservation, has argued that the best 
way to preserve threatened species is for all states to implement and 
enforce trade bans vigilantly.224 Implicit in this argument is the idea 
that trade is an effective weapon with which to defend endangered 
wildlife.225 Perhaps, but trade is hardly a universal weapon; it more 
appropriately should be seen as a device the West uses to compel 
developing countries into acquiescence.226 Vigilant trade ban enforce-
ment may be sensible global policy,227 but it is useless as local policy 
unless communities see the value of the'wildlife they are to preserve.228 
This viewpoint also raises complicated questions about who should 
control what resources.229 Mter all, states that tolerate problems asso-
ciated with preserving resources found in their territory also should 
benefit from them.2110 Yet CITES, like other international conservation 
agreements, does not make the value of membership outweigh the 
benefits of non-membership.231 Poor countries who do act to pre-
222 See Favre, Risk of Extinction, supra note 29, at 348. 
223 Ivory TradeEased, supra note 120. Since the ban was lifted, proponents of the ban contend 
that multiple elephants have been killed. See Munnion, supra note 11. Conversely, opponents of 
the ban blame conservationists and other animal activists for waging a spurious campaign about 
proliferating elephant slaughter. See Koro, supra note 115. 
224 See Favre, Risk of Extinction, supra note 29, at 350. 
225 See id.; Dunoff, supra note 10, at 1408--09. 
226 See Aoki, Neocolcmialism, supra note 114, at 20-21. Paradoxically, this inverts the idea that 
free, international trade should and will work to the benefit of all the world's nations. See RAJ 
BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 5-78 (1996). 
227 See Favre, Risk of Extinction, supra note 29, at 350. 
228 See Ivary Paradox, supra note 107, at 16. 
229 See generaUy Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 H.nv. L. REv. 
1482,1492 (1991) [hereinafter International Environmental LawJ. It should be noted that south-
ern African countries likely would be more willing participants in the ivory ban and other CITES 
initiatives if they received more funding from the West to offset the losses they endure by 
abstaining from trading ivory. See William Wilson, Environmental Law as Development Assistance, 
22 ENVTL. L. 953, 953 (1992). 
230 See Wilson, supra note 229, at 953. 
m See International Environmental Law, supra note 229, at 1492-93. Because international 
environmental customary law is so broad, states can claim almost any action complies with it. See 
id. 
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serve the environment may find themselves competitively disadvan-
taged against other similarly situated nations which opt not to take 
conservation measures.232 Generally, because of the numerous prob-
lems that plague developing nations, environmental efforts can only 
be undertaken with Western assistance.233 
To its credit, CITES does provide an incipient model within which 
to address the preservation of threatened species.234 It ultimately fails, 
though, because of its inherent disregard for local decision-makers.235 
This unfortunately seems to be the thrust of most Western-led initia-
tives to study and enrich Africa. 236 Conventions such as CITES should 
attempt to find middle ground between conservation efforts and hu-
man sustenance.237 Yet human interests largely are ignored.238 This 
exclusion is ironic because most often, Western efforts to intervene in 
the developing world are designed around the promotion of demo-
cratic ideals.239 CITES demonstrates the way Western efforts can stifle 
equali ty. 240 
Most worrisome is that this stultification is a direct product of 
Western liberalism.241 Traditionally, the liberal elements of society have 
232 See Dunoff, supra note 10, at 1437. 
233 See Wilson, supra note 229, at 964. Some development agencies, such as the United States 
Agency for International Development, which funds Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE project, now are 
providing more development aid to help countries protect the environment. See id. at 967-70; 
Rembert, supra note 14I. 
234 See generally Sands & Bedecarre, supra note 30, at 800-05. 
235 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. Commentators do not intend to disregard 
community norms, but ultimately do so when rendering their opinion, ~nevitably based on 
Western beliefs. See Storey, supra note 21, at 387. As that author explains, cbnservationists hope 
that: "once local populations realize that conservation is in their own best interests, they wiU 
cooperate willingly." [d. (emphasis added). 
235 See CASTO, supra note 13, at 265-73. 
237 See Dunoff, supra note 10, at 1454. 
238 For instance, a number of developing countries have refused to comply with international 
efforts to regulate their use of forest lands, claiming that forests are property of the sovereign 
nation. See James Brooke, Delegates frum 4 Nations Warm to High-Profile Role: Global PuwerbrOker, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1992, at AIO. Surely if forests which produce oxygen for the world can be 
owned by a sovereign nation, then elephants can. See id. As another commentator points out, if 
we are so concerned about dangers to the environment in foreign countries, why not impose 
strict penalties on our multi-national companies that destroy the ecosystems in other developing 
nations? See Wilson, supra note 229, at 975. 
239 See New Ways, supra note 89, at II. 
240 See Sands & Bedecarre, supra note 30, at 800. 
241 See id. As discussed above, animal and environmental rights groups were the guiding force 
behind CITES, and the subsequent ivory ban. See supra notes 29-32; see also KiUing to Be Kind, 
supra note 162, at 76 ("[lleft·wing western whites stand accused of neo-imperialism on behalf of 
wild animals."). 
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provided the bulwark against large corporations and other entities 
which tend to be unconcerned about social justice for oppressed peo-
ples.242 Not only has that bulwark been solid, it also has been reliable.243 
Unfortunately, many liberals have acted irresponsibly in the ele-
phant ivory debate.244 This is a dangerous precedent to set. As global 
development continues, it becomes more likely that conflicts about 
sovereignty over the world's finite resources will escalate. The CITES 
debate portends increasingly imperialistic measures whenever the de-
veloping world deviates from Western recommendations. 
242 See generally GRAHAM HANCOCK, LORDS OF POVERTY: THE POWER, PRESTIGE AND CORRUP-
TION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AID BUSINESS (1989). Hancock is emblematif of the more typical 
liberal role in ensuring justice for oppressed people. See id. 
24S See id. 
244 See Sands & Bedecarre, supra note 30, at 800; see also Manning, supra note 163 ("[sJo 
many of our . . . views and policies are based on emotion, instead of good science and good 
conservation") . 

